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BOOK REVIEWS
and victim of doubletalk,"Ml his position is located
between worker and management. He owes alle-
giance to both but can fully maintain the identity
of neither. Effective foremanship depends upon
the foreman's ability to manipulate a situation
structurally similar to that of the synthetic officer.
The difference between the positions is the privi-
lege, which the officer enjoys, of defining his own
criteria of conduct, while the foreman's criteria
are dictated and evaluated by others.
Goffman cites baseball umpire Babe Pinelli's
vision of his task as the product of the rules of
the game, the player's enthusiasm and the benevo-
lent impartiality with which they must be recon-
ciled. Pinelli states:
It is easy for any umpire to thumb a man out of the
game. It is often a much more difficult job to keep
him in the game-to understand and anticipate his
claim so that a nasty rhubarb cannot develop."6
In contrast, however, the umpire's rules are closely
supervised and his performance is both public
and evaluable.
A closer parallel to the triadic case relationship
and its place in a manipulable rule structure is the
4 Roethlisberger, The Foreman: Master and Victim
of Doubletalk, 23 HAZv. Bus. RFv. 283 (1945).
35 E. GoFFmAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN
EvERYDAY LIFE 98 (1959).
drama staged regularly in many large automobile
sales agencies: The plot begins with the customer's
decision on a car about which to negotiate a price.
The customer is then led to a room where he waits,
while the salesman leaves to "find out what he
can do." He invariably returns with an offer, the
generosity of which he punctuates in many ways.
If the customer cannot be convinced, this exit
and consultation with a higher authority may
be repeated. Various leitmotifs intervene as the
climax approaches. The climax occurs when the
source of authority or an available substitute
appears. His performance either closes the deal
or terminates the negotiations. The customer never
comes into direct conflict with the salesman, nor
is the salesman's performance anything but ac-
commodating.
While the similarities to the case supervision
pattern we have sketched are clear in this last
example, we do not wish to suggest that the intent
of the case supervision drama is as crassly moti-
vated nor as interpersonally impoverished. There
is a difference, which ought not be minimized,
between an artificial performance designed to
increase commissions and a crescive drama based
upon a genuine interest in the welfare of a client.
Whether or not that drama can survive its disen-
chantment, remains a central problem of the social
psychology of probation.
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THE RIGHT TO BE DITERENT: DEVIANCE AN]
ENFORCED THEPAPY. By Nicholas N. Kittrie.
Maryland: The John Hopkins Press, 1971. Pp.
xxii, 443. $15.00.
The case of Eric Edward Wills illustrates the
problem dealt with in Nicholas Kittrie's The Right
to Be Different. Mr. Wills was a 21-year old ice
cream salesman in England who was charged with
larceny and obtaining property under false pre-
tenses. He was sent for observation to a mental
hospital whose medical staff recommended a brain
operation in hopes that the leucotomy would cure
him of his compulsions to gambling. The magis-
trate was duly deferential to the considered opin-
ions of the experts and ordered the operation under
the 1959 Mental Health Act. Fortunately, the press
and public intervened and Mr. Wills was saved
from the knife. Unfortunately, there are hundreds
and thousands of Mr. Wills who are not saved from
the curing scalpel or other equally depersonalizing
techniques utilized by the "therapeutic state." I
The political area has become saturated in recent
I This is a term that is used throughout the book by
the author to describe the coercive application of cura-
tive techniques utilized by the state against a wide
variety of persons considered under some guise as
"dangerous." There is some ambiguity in the meaning
of the term "therapy" since the author intends to in-
clude under it even welfare programs in the socio-eco-
nomic area, only indirectly related to the manipulation
of personality and/or bodily integrity. See THE RIGHT
TO BE DixF-rEET at 346.
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years with books portraying the menance to
ordinary freedoms with the advent of high tech-
nology, combined with the will-to-power.2 Atten-
tion is now directed by Professor Kittrie to areas
of the criminal justice system where the state has
not waited for the development of controlling
technology to develop a therapeutic approach to
conformity. The Right to be Different is devoted to
a documentation of the arrival of the "therapeutic
state" in our midst. The progression, as the author
points out, has been at the expense of certain
statuses once spoken for by criminal law: juvenile
offenders, drug addicts, alcoholic offenders, psycho-
paths, sexually dangerous offenders. As these
persons were adjudged incompetent to receive the
harsh justice of traditional criminal law, they were
subjected to the ministrations of a program dedi-
cated to "curing" them of their anti-social behavior
by deceptively attractive, but sinister, means.
Instead of punishment in a prison, they were given
treatment in a hospital. The length of time might
be twice as long in the hospital; the cure might be
twice as painful; and its effect much more devastat-
ing than imprisonment, but the therapeutic pro-
gram was not challenged because it was beneficent
in purpose and controlled by "experts."
It would be difficult to argue with the facts that
Professor Xittrie has amassed. He has documented
the treatment of the sick and dangerous in generous
detail.3 The burden of the documentation is sum-
med up in his structural chapters (i.e., 1, 8, and 9)
which deal with the concept of the therapeutic
state. It is this: that persons who are subjected to
2 George Orwell's 1984 is only an early and classic
statement of the problem which other authors have
more recently documented. See the very interesting
Russian case history of political manipulation through
psychiatry, Z. & R. Mnvsu.v, A QUESTION or MAD-
NEss (1971).
3 If I were to pick at nits, I would suggest that the
author update some of his material relating to mental
health in chapter two. In it he seems to depend very
heavily on the work of the AM-.MCAN BAR FOUNDATION,
THE MENTALLY DisABLED AND TE LAW (Lindman &
McIntyre eds. 1961). To speak only of Illinois, there
have been two major revisions of the law dealing with
the mental health field since that date (1963 and 1967).
I would suspect that other states have experienced a
similar change. While Kittrie does quote from later
laws, even in Illinois, there are juxtapositions of old
and new portions of the law which leave mistaken im-
pressions. For example, Illinois law is cited as holding
that sexually dangerous persons must face charges when
discharged after a civil committment (p. 180), which
was true in 1957, but is not true presently. See ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 38, §105-9 (1971). Overall, however,
the basis of Kittrie's case is not substantially weakened
by the recent addition of some few protective procedures
in the mental health field.
compulsory therapy because of their status or
actions as offenders, but who are diverted from the
criminal justice system, need procedural as well
as substantive safeguards. The unfairness of allow-
ing the therapeutic state cure the dangerous person
without these safeguards is most strikingly told
in a chapter dealing with sterilization and lobot-
omy. While both of these techniques are somewhat
dated, they are still relevant since the power to
sterilize, castrate, and lobotomize still rests with
the state. Like the death penalty, there are indica-
tions that these techniques are not being used as
much as before,4 but the fact is that they still
represent legitimate options for the experts who
control the lives of many sick and dangerous
persons.5 Lobotomy, a first cousin to sterilization,
is still a cure for sick people who can't control their
actions, though again the experts seem less in-
dined to use this therapy than when it was first
hailed as a "cure for crime." The scalpel in the
hands of the expert seems to be more menacing to
a distrustful public, but no less threatening is the
use of psychotropic drugs used to control "incor-
rigibles" in mental and correctional institutions.
Professor Kittrie's solution to the problem is far
from simple. It might seem at first reading that
the problem of protection could be solved by the
American standby of imposing procedural reforms
on these dark processes of the law: make the expert
subject to an open hearing in court and the problem
of protection is solved. 6 But as the author points
out incessantly, the initial premise accepted by the
courts is that these procedures are civil in nature
and thus escape the rigors of ordinary criminal
process. But further, even after certain procedural
rights have occurred, there remains the very idea
of compulsory treatment for what is usually a
status and not for specific acts of dangerousness.
Does the state have the right to force a change in a
person because he is, or might be, dangerous?
'THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT at 325-26.
As Kittrie notes, the United States Supreme Court
did not disestablish the right to compel sterilization in
its decision in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942). It merely insisted there that criminals be treated
alike and not selected on the basis of the type of crime
they had committed.
6 The implication of such decisions as Specht v. Pat-
terson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967), may seem to be exactly this,
but the Supreme Court has obviously adhered to a
judicial philosophy of solving only one problem at a
time and left the issue of substantive due process to a
later date. The issue in Specht that demands initial at-
tention is the procedural due process question. Chal-
lenge to the nature of the commitment and cure under
the Colorado statute must wait for another day.
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Kittrie's answer to this is ambivalent. He argues
that insofar as the person is a welfare case,7 therapy
should be offered and made attractive, but be
purely voluntary. Insofar as the person is danger-
ous and thus requires control, he should be sub-
jected to whatever treatment is needed for social
defense of the state. This treatment may be com-
pulsory, but it is not to be confused with punish-
ment and has nothing to do with either retribution
or deterrence. As an internal limit to what can be
done to the individual, the author suggests a test
of clear and present danger, such as used in first
amendment cases. But the explanation is left
vague and one wonders what limits there are to
social defense of the state. Indeed, the author
seems convinced that the therapeutic approach is
not only present as an option today, but is both
clearly preferable to punishment and destined to
displace all criminal law as a means of social con-
trol. It is at this juncture that I definitively part
company with Kittrie's thesis. He does not, to be
sure, leave the social defense detainee without
protection. He elaborates some excellent constitu-
tional principles of both substance and procedure.'
But when pressed to make a choice, his option lies
with the social defense mode of the therapeutic
state, rather than with the penal mode of tradi-
tional criminal law.
The critical element in this choice is responsibil-
ity. Without this factor criminal law ceases to
exercise any moral role in society. Conformity will
be achieved by means of two categories only:
behavior modification of those who fail to conform,
and self-controf through subjective and private
internalization of values by those who do conform.
7The author divides the field of social control into
three branches: criminal law, welfare, and therapy. The
first deals with those people who are ordinary criminals.
The second deals with people in need of various social
services, such as the poor. The third deals with that
mixed breed whose needs have dimensions in the area of
crime, such as drug addicts.
8 Kittrie builds his argument for constitutional pro-
tection on the rather uncertain ground of Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). He argues that the
combination of amendments 1, 3, 4, and 5 can be fruit-
fully joined with the amorphous ninth amendment to
open the way for a "Therapeutic Bill of Rights." TnE
RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT at 390-94. He proposes ten
general principles to be embodied in this Bill of Rights
which include such sensible propositions as: "Man's
innate right to remain free of excessive forms of human
modification shall remain inviolable... Dual interfer-
ence by both the criminal and the therapeutic process
is prohibited ... An involuntary patient shall have the
right to receive treatment... Any compulsory treat-
ment must be the least required to reasonably protect
society." Id. at 402-04.
Obviously the absence of responsibility concerns
Kittrie for he attempts to fill the gap with a very
brief presentation of Ferri's "social responsibility"
concept.9 Apart from the brevity of the presenta-
tion, the concept itself is basically ambiguous. If
it is a responsibility in the true sense of that term,
then its grounds cannot be placed solely in the
relationship the individual has to the state. This
position betrays the very solution to the tension
between the individual and the state that one is
seeking. For if a man's responsibility is defined as
derivative from his relationship to society, then
it is the society which alone gives meaning to the
term. His freedom is solely in terms of what society
demands of him.
But this cul de sac is exactly what H. L. A. Hart
and others0 have carefully avoided. Hart has
devoted a series of essays, collected in. Punishment
and Responsibility," to the need for responsibility
in the moral sense within a system of criminal law,
even though he is careful to explain the responsibil-
ity in utilitarian terms, without its retributive
underpinnings." Coercive sanction, whether termed
punishment or treatment, must depend upon
responsibility if freedom is to prevail. Freedom is
expressed in the choice not to break the law.
Our system does not interfere till harm has been
done and has been proved to have been done with
appropriate mens rea. But the risk that is hdre
taken is not taken for nothing. It is the price we
pay for general recognition that a man's fate should
depend upon his choice and this is to foster the
prime social virtue of self-restraint.13
Without self-restraint the system of conformity
would come to depend upon massive fear or mas-
sive therapy.
All of this is not to deny the dilemma faced in
our criminal justice system which tends to exclude
(and therefore to ignore) those who are not re-
sponsible. Kittrie has done a tremendous service
in bringing together the scattered pieces of the
puzzle of what happens to these incompetents.
The therapeutic state is not the creation of a
demonic brain bent on enslaving people. Rather it
9 E. FERRI, CRInnNAL SocIOLoGY 347, 361-62 (K.
Lisle transl. 1951).
30 See, e.g., H. PACKER, THE LnrrTs OF THE CRnnxAL
S~xcno 65-66 (1968); Hawkins, Punishment and
Deterrence: The Educative, Moralizing, and Habituative
Effects, 1969 Wxs. L. REv. 550; Hart, The Aims of the
Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CON1EMP. PROB. 401 (1958).
n Oxford, 1968.
12 Id. at 181-83.
13 Id. at 182.
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is the response of humanitarian instincts, coupled
with prudent regard for the safety of society,
slowly evolving as a concept through history with
other movements toward social welfare.1 4 But what
we do to these people, no matter how beneficiently
motivated, does make a difference. It says very
much how we regard the power of the state and the
rest of us. Despite their incompetence, we are not
free to treat them without limit. I find no real
limit in Kittrie's proposals. Ironically, Professor
Kittrie has written a sincere book about the "right
to be different," but has, at the last moment,
confused this right.
PATRiCK D. McANANY
University of Illinois, Chicago Circle.
CRIME AND JUSTICE m AmERIcAN SocrnvY. Edited
by Jack D. Douglas. Indianapolis, Indiana: The
Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1971. Pp. xxi, 297.
$2.95.
Academics and practitioners who share a con-
sensus that most of the readers thrown together in
the rush to publish are full of little new and much
that is presently irrelevant will be pleasantly sur-
prised at this one of the sleepers of the year.
Organized as a direct response to the assumptions,
positions and findings of the published reports of
the Presiaent's Commission on Law Enforcement
and Administration of Justice, this reader contains
an introduction and eight major essays concerned
with the public hysteria about crime and the rea-
son-s thereof, the political decisions within and the
fallacious assumptions underlying the operations
of the criminal justice system. Readings are in-
cluded on crime and justice in American society;
criminal justice in America; crime and its impact
in an affluent society; the social reality of crime;
police mandates, strategies, and appearances;
drugs and drug control; the contrary objectives of
" The author traces cursorily the historical origins of
the therapeutic state from fourteenth century England,
through Elizabethan Poor Laws, the Classical and
Positivist Schools of Criminology, to the advent of ap-
plied medical technology in our present century. But as
valuable as this sketch is, the concept of the therapeutic
state, which quite accurately delineates our contempo-
rary world, is still in need of a first class historical
description. We can only hope that Professor Kittrie
will go back and write such a history from his excellent
beginning in this volume.
crime control and the rehabilitation of criminals;
and systems analysis confronts crime.
Unlike most books of readings and essays, es-
pecially those decrying the situation in the justice
systems, this volume contains a number of perti-
nent and particular recommendations for changing
the criminal justice system, with a major focus on
justice. As such, the writers have decided not to
limit their recommendations to what is politically
feasible, and in so doing have managed to develop
stimulating and challenging ideas and recommen-
dations for the system. This is a major contribu-
tion of their work, and its greatest problem.
For those wishing to think analytically about
the criminal justice system, this will be a must
for second courses in criminology and criminal
justice, and advanced law enforcement and social
problems courses. It has wide relevancy to graduate
instruction in all four areas, and academics might
want to give serious consideration to adopting this
inexpensive paperback book, especially for courses
designed to effect advantageous changes in both
our approaches to the criminal justice system and
to the training of persons who have this area as
their major interest.
The major weakness of the book lies in its basic
thrust. The entrenched, with vested interests in
maintaining the status quo, may soon find ways
to challenge the legitimacy of the work of these
writers and their innovative positions, for the
analyses and recommendations, if implemented in
tolo, would bring extensive change in the criminal
justice areas concerned.
The book could benefit from far more extensive
foot-noting (some of the material is especially
familiar), and the chapters are somewhat uneven
in their content, relative worth, and potential
contributions. This reviewer was most impressed'
with those essays by Douglas (on crime and
justice), Manning (on police mandates and strate-
gies), and Churchill (on systems analysis and
crime). All in all, the reader is well worth the ef-
forts of the writers and is highly recommended to
practitioners, academics ana other citizens con-
cerned with changing the wide spectrum and
operations of the criminal justice system.
HAaRY E. AtLrN
The Ohio State University
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